OWASP Belgium Chapter

The OWASP Foundation http://www.owasp.org

The Belgian e-ID: hacker vs developer

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Agenda

- eID Card Introduction
- eID Card Integration
- Examples of bad implementations



Who are we?

- Frank: eID Architect at Fedict
 - eID Middleware
 - eID Applet
 - eID Trust Service, jTrust, eID IdP, eID DSS
- Erwin: whitehat hacker at ZION SECURITY



eID Card Introduction



elD in Belgium

• eID cards issued (16/01/2010)

- 8.220.456 citizen eID cards (full deployment)
- 511.774 foreigner eID cards
- 186.011 kids eID cards

Technology

- RSA 1024 smart card
- QC with 5 year validity

Involved major organizations:


- FedICT: Federal ICT
 - PKI, client software, SOA solutions
- National Registry
 - user database, card issuing



eID Card

Physical Structure

Logical Structure



APDU

Belgian eID Card JavaCard Applet


JavaCard Virtual Machine

Basic Operating System

Infineon Chip (SLE66CX322P)



eID Card Content






eID Card Functionality

- Non-electronic functionality
 - Visible Identification
 - Visible Authentication via facial recognition and/or hand-written signature (a kind of challenge)
- Electronic functionality
 - Identification: who are you?
 - Passive eID usage
 - Privacy sensitive
 - Authentication: can you prove who you are?
 - Active challenging the eID card + eID user (2 factor)
 - Digital Signing: non-repudiation signature
 - Prove of acknowledgment at a point in time







elD Card Integration



eID Card Interfacing

Via APDU messages

- Application Protocol Data Unit
- Command: from the reader to the card
- Response: from the card to the reader
- Example: Creation of a signature
 - Set APDU: select the key. 0x82 = authn key
 - Prepare DigestInfo PKCS1 DER sequence
 - Verify PIN APDU: (PIN BCD encoded)
 - Compute Digital Signature APDU
 - Retrieve signature data
- Doing the APDU interface is crazy



eID Card APDU Demo



eID Card Integration


Web Application eID Card

Important aspects when integrating:


- Ease of integration
- Secure usage of eID
- •Platform independent solution:
 - Windows
 - Linux
 - Mac OS X
- •Multiple browser support:
 - Firefox
 - MS IE
 - Safari
 - Chrome
- Integration point abstraction level
- Idiot proof eID components



elD Architecture



eID Identification



- Identification: who are you?
- Readout of the eID Identity, Address and Photo files.
- Server-side identity file parsing
- Server-side integrity validation of all identity files is possible via NRN signature




eID Applet

- Java 6 Web Browser eID Component
- Supports multiple web browsers:
 - Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, Safari
- Platform-independent:
 - Windows, Linux, Mac OS X
- Interactive eID card handling
- Support for secure CCID pinpad readers
- Web developer friendly
- Open Source Software: GNU LGPL 3
 - http://code.google.com/p/eid-applet/



eID Applet Architecture





eID Applet Identification

identify-the-user.html

```
<script src="https://www.java.com/js/deployJava.js"></script>
<script>
    var attributes = {
        code :'be.fedict.eid.applet.Applet.class',
        archive :'eid-applet.jar',
        width :600,
        height :300
    };
    var parameters = {
        TargetPage :'identification-result-page.jsp',
        AppletService :'applet-service',
    };
    var version = '1.6';
    deployJava.runApplet(attributes, parameters, version);
</script>
                                                            identification-result-page.jsp
                                                    <%@page import="be.fedict.eid.applet.service.Identity"%>
                                                    <html>
                                                    <body>
                                                        <%=((Identity) session.getAttribute("eid.identity")).name%>
                                                    </body>
                                                    </html>
                         web.xml
<servlet>
    <servlet-name>AppletServiceServlet</servlet-name>
    <servlet-class>be.fedict.eid.applet.service.AppletServiceServlet</servlet-class>
</servlet>
<servlet-mapping>
    <servlet-name>AppletServiceServlet</servlet-name>
    <url-pattern>/applet-service</url-pattern>
</servlet-mapping>
```



eID Identification Demo



eID Identity Integrity

- eID Applet reads the identity files and NRN signatures, posts to eID Applet Service
- Server-side verification of the NRN signatures over the identity, photo and address files by the eID Applet Service
- Verification of the NRN certificate chain via the IdentityIntegrityService SPI

```
<servlet>
```

```
</servlet>
```

<servlet-mapping>

```
<servlet-name>AppletIntegrityServiceServlet</servlet-name>
```

```
<url-pattern>/applet-service-integrity</url-pattern>
```

```
</servlet-mapping>
```




eID Identification Demo Integrity Validation



elD Card Cloning

- eID has a 3th key pair: card authn key
- eID Card Authentication signature can be created without PIN verification
- eID Card Authentication allows for detection of a cloned eID card
- eID Card Authentication signature cannot be verified due to missing corresponding public key.
- National Registry needs to make the public key available as an eID file
- Would prevent identity fraude





Entity Authentication

- Entity authentication is the process whereby one party is assured of the identity of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired)
- Formal definition (A authenticated B if):
 - Alice A, Bob B
 - A believes freshness challenge_A
 - A believes (B recently said challenge_A)
- Authentication vs. Session Key Establishment
- How to achieve this using an eID card?



eID Authentication

- Authentication Private Key (1024 bit RSA)
 - PKCS1-RSA
 - PIN authorization for Authn Key usage
 - Card caches the authn PIN authorizations
 - Log-off instruction to reset PIN authorization
- Creation of a signature:
 - Set APDU: select the key. 0x82 = authn key
 - Prepare DigestInfo PKCS1 DER sequence
 - Verify PIN APDU: (PIN BCD encoded)
 - Compute Digital Signature APDU
 - Retrieve signature data
- eID can only sign (RSA decryption of DigestInfo)

Authentication Protocol


- eID authentication by itself is useless
- Remote Entities, e.g. web application context.
- We need an Authentication Protocol
- Different Authentication Protocols are possible
- Each Entity Authentication Protocol yields its own cryptographic goals.
 - Of course Entity Authentication
 - Session key via combined Key Agreement (SSL)
- DO NOT TRY TO INVENT YOUR OWN PROTOCOL!
 - Needham-Schroeder protocol: replay attack
 - Creativity is great for non-critical applications, like music.



Candidate Protocols

- Mutual SSL
 - Browser initiated SSL handshake
 - Relies on eID PIN authorization caching feature
- Tunneled Entity Authentication
 - Uses unilateral SSL to authenticate the server
 - Based on ISO/IEC 9798-3 Authentication SASL Mechanism (RFC 3163)
 - Cryptographic channel binding to secure the channel (RFC 5056)
 - Requires an eID Applet (or browser extension)
 - Explicit eID card management possible
 - Sequential eID card access possible

Unilateral SSL



28



SSL Features

- Resuming a TLS connection
 - HelloClient(session_id)
 - Reusing the same master_secret
 - Reduces load due to a full TLS handshake
- Renegotiating the SSL handshake
 - Over an already established SSL connection
 - Useful when client authentication is required
 - Both client and server can initiate a renegotiation
 - Not all SSL stacks support this (Java does not)
 - Security flaws in implementations

Mutual SSL via eID

Bob

Alice

HelloClient(ciphers,Ra) HelloServer(cipher,Rb) Certificate(cert chain) CertificateRequest,ServerHelloDone Certificate(cert chain) ClientKeyExchange {pre master secret}Kb+ **CertificateVerify** sign_Ka-(handshake_msgs) **ChangeCipherSpec** ClientFinish (encrypted) PRF(master_secret,handshake_msgs)

ChangeCipherSpec

ServerFinish (encrypted) PRF(master_secret,handshake_msgs) Ra: random by A Rb: random by B Kb+: public key of B pre_master_secret: random by A Ka-: private key of A PRF: pseudo-random function

Entity Authentication


A believes freshness Ra
A believes (B recently said Ra)
B believes freshness Rb

•B believes (A recently said Rb)



eID SSL Authentication

- So we need two SSL terminations:
 - One for unilateral SSL
 - One for the mutual SSL using eID
- Requires 2 IP addresses (+ DNS names), or at least 2 different ports.




- Problem: how to properly link the SSL sessions?
 - If same IP address, via session cookies
 - If different IP address, via signed SAML tickets



eID SSL Authentication


- How about session life cycles?
- The Application Server cannot inform SSL to terminate that easily...





eID SSL Authentication Demo

Tunneled Entity Authn




- ISO/IEC 9798-3 Authentication SASL Mechanism
 - RFC 3163
 - Unilateral client authentication: server already authenticated via unilateral SSL connection
- Did we achieve the same effect as mutual SSL?
- What if challenge actually is SHA1(contract)?
- B can abuse A's challenge signature.

elD Tunneled Entity Authentication Demo




MITM attack on SASL



- Mallory can abuse the authentication token of Alice
- Why is this going wrong?
 - SSL: sign_Ka-(handshake_msgs) so the signature digests parts of the secure channel's "identity"
 - SASL: sign_Ka-(Ra,challenge) does not digest any part of the secure channel's "identity".



Secure Channel Binding




- RFC 5056: cryptographic binding
- channel_binding =
 - Hostname B (nice try)
 - Inet address B (nice try)
 - SSL certificate B (OK)
 - SHA1(master_key) (even better)
- A channel binding should really digest part of the channel's "identity". Alice's SSL stack must support this.



Secure Channel Binding Demo



eID Applet Signatures





eID Applet Signature Demo



Examples of Bad Implementations



Examples of bad implementations

- Identification is not authentication
- Unsecure trust in a third party
- After successful authentication abuse HTTP
- Web vulnerabilities in an eID site



Identification is not authentication

- Using a Java applet to retrieve first name and last name and use this for authentication => bad
- Without using HTTPS
 - · Sniffing
 - \cdot MITM
 - · XSRF



Unsecure trust in a third party

- Authentication occurs using a redirect or intercept by reverse proxy
- To forward credentials to web application, an insecure mechanism is used
- HTTP Header contains NRN: can be spoofed, hijacked



After successful authentication abuse HTTP

- Session cookie is used to maintain state
- Redirect to HTTP

 Sniff cookie and spoof
 authentication



Web vulnerabilities in an eID site

- Cross-site-scripting to steal session cookie
- SQL Injection *
- XSRF
- Broken authorization



Questions?