

Security of Containers

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
About myself

- Enterprise Security Architect
- 12+ years of experience in Information Security
- Experience with security frameworks like ISO27001 and PCI-DSS
- Policies, Processes and Technology
- CISA, CRISC, CISSP, CCSK, ITILv3
- Architecture, Design, Implementation and Maintenance of security systems



What are containers?

- An application container is a mechanism that is used to isolate applications from each other within the context of a running operating system instance.
 - Conceptually, an application container is similar to a jail filesystem. When configured to do so, applications contained within a container cannot access components outside of the established boundary.
 - A container has a segmented network stack, process space and instance of a filesystem
 - A container shares the operating system with other containers that are running on the host
- Containers like any other asset need to be assured for security





Uses of containers

- Malware analysis
- Easier deployment of repetitive jobs
- Micro-services
- Deployments to hybrid cloud, multicloud





Background of containers

Linux features

– Namespaces –

- CGroups Isolate and manage resources
- PID namespaces Creates hierarchies of isolated sub-processes
- IPC Inter-process communication
- Network Separates network stack
- Mount mount and unmount file systems without affecting the host file system
- User Separates user ids and host ids between hosts and containers
- UTS provide isolation of two system identifiers: the hostname and the NIS domain name
- chroot allows a process to change its root file system








Security in Containers

- What are the risks
 - Unauthorised inter-process communication (5 -> 8)
 - A process running as root (8 running as root)
 - Unauthorised network connections
 - Denial of Service via excessive consumption of resources
- How are they addressed
 - Namespaces
 - SELinux
 - AppArmor
 - Seccomp BPF





Container images

- Container image

 At rest
- Container

– When running



Who does the Heavy Lifting?

- Container runtimes / container software
 - Unpacks required files and metadata of an image before handing off to kernel
 - Makes API call to kernel
 - Initiates isolation and mounts the files
 - Responsible for:
 - Handling user input
 - Handling input over an API often from a Container Orchestrator
 - Preparing a container mount point



Connecting them all


Container orchestration

 Pulls images from registry
 Schedules workloads within a cluster



Why is security assurance for containers essential?


- Attack surface includes:
 - Isolation of containers
 - Configuration of containers
 - Container software
 - Host operating system
- And the applications themselves






Why is security assurance for containers essential?

- Threats include:
 - Lateral privilege escalation
 - Exploitation of lack of secure configs
 - Exploitation of vulnerabilities in container software
 - Exploitation of vulnerabilities on host operating system
- Exploitation of vulnerabilities and configurations of the applications





The Start - Operating System layer



- Controls
 - Operating Systems
 - Secure configurations are critical. Do not mix containerized and non-containerized workloads on the same host instance
 - Apply security controls outlined for operating systems (hardening, patching, FIM, access control)
 - Network
 - Implement & enforce network segmentation
 - Following are the network configurations that apply in this scenario
 - Bridge
 - Host
 - None


- Vulnerabilities:
 - Operating systems have vulnerabilities if they are not hardened by removing unwanted services and protocols.
 - Operating systems are applications and have coding errors. Coding errors become vulnerabilities if they are not patched on time.
 - Incorrectly applied access control opens an attack surface that can be used by malicious actors

Container specific OS (Examples include CoreOS Container Linux, Project Atomic Google Container-Optimized OS, Bottlerocket from AWS)



- So on

The Next Layer - Container Software / Runtime




- Controls
 - Runtime
 - Keep container software up to date
 - Use role-based access control (RBAC) to restrict access to key components
 - Runtime security
 - Document known container processes
 - Monitor writes to operating system
 - Document and monitor network traffic
 - Explicitly define the permissions required by the container and its components

- Vulnerabilities:
 - Malicious actors trying to break out of container isolation
 - Missing patches on container software / runtime
 - /bin or /etc writes on operating systems
 - Ingress / egress traffic from containers
 - Rogue containers

Container Software / runtimes (runC, Docker, AWS Fargate, Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon ECS, LXC)



The Next Layer - Storage and retrieval




- Controls
 - Registry
 - Secure connection to registries (over TLS connection)
 - Secure images stored in registries
 - Role based access control applied to registries
 - Scan images
 - Orchestration
 - Access control (based on least privileges and separation of duties)
 - Grouping containers of relative sensitivity
 - Introducing nodes securely into cluster
 - Ensure that only containers with the same level of exposure (e.g. Internet facing) run on the same node.
 - Ensure that only containers with the same data classification level run on the same node.
 - Ensure that containers that are no longer needed are deleted.
 - Rotate the keys used by the orchestration process on a regular basis
 - Monitor Orchestration tool for vulnerabilities and patch regularly
 - Enable role based access control
 - Use registry namespace

- Vulnerabilities:
 - Missing access control
 - Lack of secure connection
 - Security of the orchestration tool
 - Images created with sensitive data

 Docker registry, Azure registry, OpenShift registry, redhat registry, Google registry, Kubernetes



The Next Layer - Creation, testing and accreditation




Control

- Image creation and vulnerability scanning (*pipeline-based build approach, address component vulnerabilities and malicious code*)
- Secure configuration best practices (validation of configuration settings, access control users running as non-privileged users, monitoring, no remote administration tools)
- Separating secrets from containers (*DB* connection string part of a separate container with different access control, using secret management systems)
- Trusted images (images with cryptographic signatures)
- CI/CD pipeline

- Vulnerabilities:
 - Poisoned images
 - Embedded credentials
 - Lack of access control
 - Outdated components
 - And so on



Containers themselves



- Control
 - Use immutable images to instantiate containers
 - Enforce isolation/ segmentation by application / service / workload
 - Monitor containers for suspicious process or file system activity
 - Quarantine compromised containers
 - If not using immutable images, ensure an automated software update/replace process is implemented
 - Limit/ restrict access to resources (file system / kernel)
 - Regular automated security scans which cover the whole operating system and not just container related elements

- Vulnerabilities:
 - Unauthorised inter-process communication
 - Unauthorised breakout
 - Privilege escalation (account gaining uid0 privileges)
 - Stale images
 - Misconfigured applications running in containers
 - And so on



Summary

- Securing containers is not security of containers
- To ensure that you have a secure container ecosystem, secure the whole stack
 - Operating system
 - Container runtime
 - Image repositories
 - Orchestration tools
 - And the applications running in the containers



Questions



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